"Vistula -SAN, BATTLES OF THE. - In the Austro-German autumn campaign of 1914 against Russia (see Eastern Euro Pean Front Campaigns; also Map, Plate I., under same heading), the battles of the Vistula and the fighting on the San, with the battle of Chyrow, from Sept. 9 to Nov. 5, form a series of operations which are described below.
The retreat of the Austro;Hungarian armies in the middle of Sept. to the San and the area around and S. of Przemysl had hardly been completed when the Russian forces made ready to cross the San at its mouth with a view to enveloping Dankl's army, both at that point and on the left bank of. the Vistula.
After the recent heavy fighting, in which Austria-Hungary had drawn upon herself alone the whole weight of the superior force of Russia, her army was exhausted and anything but fit to hold the San against the on-coming, steadily increasing mass of Russians. And yet if they were allowed to advance any further, not only would the Austro-Hungarian army be shattered but one of the main German industrial areas - Upper Silesia - would be in danger. For the protection of this area and the support of her ally, it was necessary for Germany to send immediate reinforcements. Negotiations to this end began between the two army commands by the middle of September.
Considerable portions of the German VIII. Army had been set free after the successful battles on the Masurian lakes. While the Austro-Hungarian armies were shaking off the enemy, a IX. German army under the command of Gen. von Hindenburg had been constituted in S. Poland and Upper Silesia out of the German XI., XVII. and XX. Corps, the Guard Res. Corps and a combined Corps, together with the 8th Ca y. Division. This army was drawn up for deployment along the line PrzynowLelow-Wolbrom-Cracow by the end of September.
On Sept. 16, protected by the Przemysl fortress, which was left to its fate, and the bridgeheads of Sieniawa and Jaroslaw, evacuated on Sept. 18 and 20 respectively, the Austro-Hungarian armies resumed the retreat which led them back to the line of the Dunajec, the Biala, and the farther side of the Carpathian ridge, by the end of the month. The Russians attempted no real pursuit, but sent only weak forces after them to beyond the Wislok. They regarded the Austro-Hungarian army as wornout, and turned their attention to preparing a powerful push through Poland into the heart of Germany.
The Austro-Hungarian armies, after re-establishment, were to join the German IX. Army in a new offensive which aimed at beating the Russians and relieving Przemysl.
==The Austro-German Advance on the San-Vistula Line (Oct. 9 19 1 4)==The idea underlying the new offensive was as follows: Hindenburg's army was to advance on the stretch of the Vistula between Zawichost and Ivangorod and envelope the Russians from the north. The Austro-Hungarian armies were to advance with a small group on the N. bank of the Vistula, but with their main forces to the S. of the river by way of Rzeszow and Krosno to the San and on Przemysl, while the II. Army moved forward correspondingly in the region S. of Przemysl.
The Russians were well aware of these measures, and as soon as the advance of the Allies began they abandoned the siege of Przemysl and withdrew their forces remaining in Galicia to the San and to the E. and S. of Przemysl, where they fortified their positions. Their main strength they concentrated in the first instance at Ivangorod, and later at Warsaw, in order to fall on Hindenburg's northern flank and thus compel the Allies to retire. As early as Sept. 22 the latter received the first news of the formation of a Russian IX. Army in the region round Ivangorod, and from this time reports kept pouring in of the shifting of strong Russian forces northward. It therefore became incumbent upon the Austro-Hungarian army to make a vigorous onslaught on the Russians, in order to contain as large a number of their forces as possible. The demand thus made upon it that army was in a position to meet only conditionally owing to the superiority of the Russians, who had meanwhile been reinforced by Siberian and Caucasian troops.
While on Oct. 4 the main forces of the Austro-Hungarian armies were advancing eastward S. of the Vistula, the German XI. Corps at Opatow and the Austro-Hungarian 3rd and 7th Cay. Divs. at Klimontow on the N. of that river came upon the enemy and drove him behind the stretch of the San between Sandomierz and Zawichost by Oct. 5. The Austro-Hungarian main forces in the area S. of the Vistula encountered at first only Russian cavalry. Until the San was reached only comparatively slight resistance was offered by the Russians. Only the IV. Army, of which the command had been taken over by the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand in the beginning of Oct., and the N. wing of the III. Army had to battle with and overcome strong Russian forces round Rzeszow, Lancut, and Barycz on Oct. 7 and 8. The I. Army, after some brief combats, was able to drive over the San the portions of the Russian V. Army which had remained in the angle of the San and Vistula. By Oct. 10 the Russians were over the San and behind Przemysl, with the exception of parts of the Russian III. Army, which held out until Oct. 12 at Jaroslaw on the W. bank of the San.
While the advance was still in progress news came of a north-: ward diversion of the Russian V. Army. Large Russian forces were also debouching from Ivangorod and Warsaw. All the indications pointed to the fact that the Russians had transferred their centre of gravity to the Warsaw-Ivangorod stretch of the Vistula. The original plan of forcing the Vistula with Hindenburg's army between Zawichost and Ivangorod could not now be carried out. Instead, while the Austrian I. Army advanced gradually down the Vistula to the mouth of the Kamienna, Hindenburg was to cross the Vistula below Ivangorod, having first driven the Russian forces from Warsaw and Ivangorod back across the Vistula. The Austro-Hungarian main army was to make a vigorous effort to force the San and once more push on toward Lublin and Chelm.
Battles of Warsaw and Ivangorod (Oct. .ro-Nov. 5). - The advancing corps of Hindenburg's army came into contact with large Russian forces to the S. of Ivangorod and Kalwarija and at Mszczonow-Grojec, and these they drove back on Oct. Io. South of Warsaw, where the resistance offered was only slight, the German corps gained ground, taking Blonie; but at Ivangorod and Alexandrya the attacks of the III. Caucasian Corps made things very uncomfortable for them.
The Russian offensive advance across the Vistula below Zawichost seemed to be getting well under way. The German IX. Army was reinforced without delay by two divisions on its right wing, and three more divisions of the I. Army were pushed forward into the Radom--Ilzanka area. To Hindenburg's left wing were sent two Landwehr Brigades and the Austro-Hungarian 7th Ca y. Div., which, with the German 8th Ca y. Div. was formed into a Ca y. Corps under Gen. von Korda.
The fighting persisted stubbornly on both sides. In view of the constant Russian reinforcements, Hindenburg could achieve a decisive success neither at Warsaw nor at Kalwarija or Ivangorod. When, on Oct. 15, his left wing was forced back at Blonie-Grodisk, the Allied Army Commands were more and more inclined to think that the Russian main attack was about to be launched from Warsaw with two armies, the II. and V. Armies. The Allies decided to meet this attack by the German IX. Army on the line Lowicz-Skierniewice-Rawa-NowemiastoRadom. The Austro-Hungarian I. Army meanwhile was to concentrate seven divisions in the Radom-Ilzanka sector in readiness for an attack on Ivangorod. This concentration of the I. Army was completed by Oct. 21. The IX. Army held its ground against the numerical superiority of the Russians until Oct. 19, when, after Korda's Ca y. Corps had dispersed a Russian Ca y. Corps near Sochaczew, it retired to the above line.
Simultaneous attempts to force the San were made by those portions of the Austro-Hungarian I. and IV. Armies posted on the lower San, but though partial successes were achieved, no tangible results were possible in view of the Russians' powerful counter-attacks, particularly as the Russians had succeeded in taking the W. bank of the San at Biellny, Zarzecze and Monasterz. For this brought the X. Corps of the Austro-Hungarian I. Army over to the W. bank of the Vistula, and the IV. Army had to take over the defence of the whole line of the San. To the W. of Warsaw the Russians were extending still further westward, and bringing up forces to the Lower Bzura, where the Russian I. Army was being formed.
On Oct. 21 Hindenburg and Dankl were grouped for attack in the order arranged, and on the 22nd Dankl advanced to the assault. In the battle of Ivangorod which followed (Oct. 22-7), some fine initial successes were obtained by the I. Army and the German Guard Res. Corps fighting on its left wing, but the 37th Honved Div., fighting on the right wing, was placed in a very critical position by the extremely violent attacks of the Russian XXV. and XIV. Corps. Embittered fighting persisted for the next few days on the I. Army's front. On Oct. 24, Hindenburg was attacked along the whole of the front by the Russian II. and V. Armies, but was able to repulse all their assaults. On Oct. 26 the Russians drove their right wing forward through Gadin, Osmolin and Lowicz. Here four Russian Corps forced back two German Landwehr B des., Korda's Ca y. Corps and some German Landsturm. Hindenburg's main force, four Corps strong, was opposed by six Russian Corps, and the seven Austro-Hungarian Divs. posted in the direction of Ivangorod had to cope with double their own numbers.
As there was no prospect of a successful issue, and as an enforced retreat had in places already set in, the battle was broken off on Oct. 27. Leaving Dankl's army to put up an obstinate resistance along the line Kielce-Gura-Opuczna-OpatowSandomierz, Hindenburg led his army back to the line SieradzJedrziejow. The Guard Res. Corps was to remain on the left wing of the I. Army, while Field-marshal Lt. Freiherr von Haner's Ca y. Corps, newly formed out of the 2nd, 3rd and 9th Cay. Divs., was to constitute a liaison between the two armies.
Battle of the Opatowka (Oct. 31-Nov. 2)
The Russians pursued the Austro-Hungarian I. Army with their IX. and IV. Armies, the German IX. with their V. and II. Armies. Meanwhile the newly formed I. Army on the Russian right wing advanced on Kutno. By Oct. 30 the Austro-Hungarian I. Army had reached its position and strengthened it technically against all emergencies. On Oct. 31 the columns of the Russian IX. Army appeared at Opatow and proceeded to attack violently both there and on the Opatowka. At Kielce the fighting was of secondary importance, but E. of Opatow the Russians were aiming at a breakthrough. On Nov. 2 Dankl's right wing retired behind the Koprzywianka, exposing the flank of the Austro-Hungarian IV. Army fighting on the far side of the Vistula.
In view of the vigorous Russian pursuit and the impossibility of holding the Koprzywianka any longer with troops that were already greatly exhausted, the Austro-Hungarian higher command agreed to the retreat behind the Nida proposed by the I. Army command. On Nov. 3 the I. Army with the Guard Res. Corps, reached the area W. of the Czarna and Czarna Nida and on the 4th shook off the Russian IX. Army completely. On Nov. 5 the army crossed the Nida and on the 6th continued its march into the area round Cracow.
The German IX. Army, which remained practically unmolested during the whole retreat, commenced its further retirement to the Silesian frontier in the night of Nov. 3 and 4, arriving there on the 5th.
Battle of Chyrow (Oct. 13-Nov. 2). - The Austro-Hungarian II. Army had advanced to the S. of the III. Army, without encountering enemy opposition, but under the most unfavourable conditions imaginable. The leading division reached Kroscienko on Oct. 9, only to find the Chyrow defile, through which the advance to the area E. of Przemysl was to be made, blocked by the Russian XXIV. Corps. Gen. von Tersztyanszky's column (the IV. Corps), which had pushed on further to the E., reached Turka after taking the Uszok pass by hard fighting.
The II. Army came up against strong enemy forces, firmly established in well-prepared positions on the heights S. of Stary Sambor, and on those opposite the S. wing of Boroevic's army. With its main force, the VII. and XII. Corps, the II. Army attacked the enemy's position S. of Czyszki, on both sides of the Blozewka hollow and at Starasol. Tersztyánszky's group, coming from the S. was to take the heights S. of Stary Sambor and push forward with one column (the 38th Honved Inf. Div. and 5th and 8th Ca y. Divs.) through the Bystrycza valley to Sambor. Working in harmony with this attack, the S. wing of the III. Army, which was opposed by numerically superior Russian forces, was also to push forward. Gen. von Boroevic reinforced this wing by bringing up the III. Corps and the 23rd Honved Inf. Div. from the area N. of Przemysl, where they had just driven the Russians across the San. The II. Army aimed at forcing a decision with Tersztyanszky's group. But while the preliminary battles were being successfully conducted there, a heavy Russian counter-attack set in in front of the left army wing. This led to very heavy fighting on the heights S. of Stary Sambor, at Slochynia, Blozew Gorna and Towarnia, and necessitated the putting in of all available reserves. The right army wing was able to achieve some successes in fighting down the Russian opposition, but an advance on the left wing by the XII. Corps was quite impossible, for there the Russians were doing their utmost to break through to Chyrow and Dobromil. The 10th Honved Inf. Div. and 34th Inf. Div. fighting on that wing had to be withdrawn to the area E. of Towarnia and toward Blozew Gorna, and from Grodowice to Slochynia, and even after the 17th Inf. Div. came on the field they could not stand against the overwhelming onslaught. Just when the situation looked most threatening, the 12th Inf. Bde. of the III. Corps arrived on the battlefield, and although not able to turn the scale it relieved the pressure on the Honved Inf. Div., which was the most exhausted.
On the morning of Oct. 16, the Russians were resuming their attacks, when the III. Corps made its counter-attack directed against the heights of Czyszki, Guty and Wegrzeliska. But though the coming into action of the III. Corps brought some relief to the fighting divisions, no success could be expected in view of the continuous vehement Russian attacks, and more especially, the devastating flank fire from the Czyszki and Magiera heights. To conquer these heights Boroevic now brought up the XI. Corps also to the area S. of Przemysl. But in the night of Oct. 17-8, the Russians once more pushed forward with strong forces into the Blozewka hollow, and threw back the 22nd Inf. Div. onto the heights E. of Nowemiasto. The 34th Inf. Div. was likewise forced to give ground, and Blozew Gorna was given up to the enemy. On Oct. 19, the XI. Corps, advancing through Stroniowice and Tyszkowice on Mizyniec and Chodnowice, flung themselves into the battle, and drove the Russians back. Close by, a little further S., the 44th Inf. Div. stormed the Magiera height, and the advance of the III. Corps was made considerably easier. When the 23rd Honved Inf. Div. attacked from Byblo, it carried the whole front with it. The 2 2nd Inf. Div. recaptured Sanoczany, the 6th Inf. Div. seized Blozew Gorna, and the 28th Inf. Div. worked its way through to the edge of a wood opposite the Wegrzeliska height. The danger of a break-through now seemed to be finally averted.
Meanwhile Tersztyanszky's group on the right wing of the II. Army had also had some hard battles. In the Bystrycza valley the 38th Honved Inf. Div. column, which had gone on ahead, succeeded in heating back through Zalokiec, Podbuz and Uroz the Cossacks who had been pushed forward to protect the Russian left wing. But on Oct. 18 the Russians brought up new forces through Boryslaw with which to attack this column in flank, whereupon the column had to be taken back to the heights W. of Zalokiec and Podbuz. In the meantime Gen. Hofmann's Corps, destined for the defence of the Carpathians, which had advanced over the Beskid Pass on Oct. 8, had taken Stryj and despatched a group to Drohobycz. This group came up in front of Drohobycz on Oct. 2 1, but the Russians in the meantime had attacked Gen. Hofmann with greatly superior forces, so that the detachment sent to Drohobycz had to intervene at Stryj. It was therefore unable to procure any relief for the II. Army particularly as Gen. Hofmann had also been forced to retreat.
Simultaneously with this, the attack along the whole front of the II. and III. Armies was continued. In the case of the III. Army this culminated in the attempt to capture the Czyszki heights and in the defence of the Magiera height against the Russians who were longing to regain it, while the II. Army aimed at relieving the enemy pressure on the right wing. But by Oct. 23 the great numerical superiority of the Russians at this point had become evident, and the II. Army command found it necessary to bring back the IV. Corps - consisting of the 38th Honved Inf. Div., the 31st Inf. Div. and the ist, 5th and 8th Ca y. Divs. - without delay to the heights N.E. of Turka. The XII. Corps was to remain on the heights W. of Stary Sambor, and the IV. Corps was brought up from the III. Army to fill the gap between the two. The Russians kept touch with the retreating divisions but for the moment attempted no sort of pursuit.
The III. Army, stricken with cholera and short of munitions, had not been able to achieve any real success up to Oct. 26. On the afternoon of that day a general attack was delivered by the III. Army with the object of relieving the II. Army, but as this also failed almost completely the front was technically strengthened and the reserves were taken out of it and placed at the disposal of the II. Army.
Meanwhile the Russians had not molested the II. Army's right wing to any extent, but directed their energies toward the gap between the IV. and XII. Corps, where they hoped to break through. Their attack on Oct. 26 across the Holownia height had begun to look like a break-through, when Field-marshal St. Krautwald's group of the III. Army, together with two newly arrived Landsturm territorial brigades and a few march battalions, came to the rescue. The IV. Corps, as soon as it had recovered a little from the recent heavy fighting, went over to the attack, and took the Bzeniec, Podzemen and Zwihonka heights.
The attack by Krautwald's group and the IV. Corps had good results. By Oct. 31 the Russian VII. Corps had been driven from the stubbornly defended Holownia height. As this attack progressed, the XII. Corps and, shortly after, the III. Army joined in. On the morning of Nov. 2, the whole of the II. Army was engaged in the attack. Hofmann's Corps, which had retired on Skole after the abortive advance on Drohobycz, also joined in: the renewed attack on Stryj. The XII. Corps came up close to Stary Sambor and up to the Kundieska height. The IV. Corps approached the strong Russian position Lisyj height - Zalarski height and the heights E. of Podbuz.
Just as the battle at Chyrow seemed at last to be taking a favourable turn, after the II. Army had received reinforcements, and the reconstruction of the railways leading to Chyrow and Przemysl promised a considerable improvement in the service of munitions and supplies, there came the order to retire, an order totally unexpected by the troops of the II. and III. Army engaged in the attack.
The army higher command had already informed the army commands on Oct. 27 of the unfavourable situation in the bend of the Vistula, and announced the possibility of the breaking off of the battle. The position of the armies fighting on the San, at Przemysl and at Chyrow, had been made untenable by the withdrawal of the German IX. Army and the Austro-Hungarian I. Army from the line Sieradz - Kielce, and from the Opatowka to behind the Nida - practically to the Silesian frontier. In spite of the successes just achieved on the S. wing, therefore, the Austro-Hungarian armies had again to be led back, in view of the general situation. In Upper Silesia, in the Cracow area and in Western Galicia, a new grouping of the Austro-Hungarian armies was to be undertaken, under the protection of the Carpathian ridge, in readiness for a new offensive in better circumstances in conjunction with the German IX. Army - which was also to be reorganized.
The retreat was begun in the night of Nov. 2-3, by the left wing of the Austro-Hungarian IV. Army, and by the right wing, now amalgamated with the III. Army. Both these and the IT. Army broke contact with the enemy in the night of Nov. 4-5.
(E. J.)
