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MAUBEUGE, SIEGE OF (1914). - The fortress of Maubeuge, which in oldtime wars played an important role as commanding the routes leading from the Spanish or Austrian Netherlands to the Oise valley, was reconstructed as a ring fortress of the modern type between 1878 and 1896, under the defence scheme of Gen. Sere de Rivieres. Its function, like that of Besancon on the other flank of the French eastern front, was in substance to absorb the forces of a German army which should seek to turn the flank of the Lorraine-Meuse defence. The great development of communications of all sorts in north-eastern France and Belgium had robbed the place of its former significance as a road centre and river crossing, but on the other hand it was the junction of several lines of railway, and the control of these by fortifications was justified, if not absolutely essential. By 1914 however, conditions had altered considerably. Progress in siege artillery equipment had made Sere de Rivieres' designs obsolete, and French mobilization plans had been so far perf ected that it was thought possible to initiate operations by an offensive from the eastern front towards the Saar. In these circumstances the French General Staff was confronted with the choice between spending large sums of money on modernizing Maubeuge, or else treating it as a place of subordinate importance; and thus the door was opened for differences of opinion which resulted in the place being neither modernized nor demilitarized. The question of reconstruction was put aside as of " no immediate interest until work on the eastern fortresses has been completed." In 1910, the governor was officially informed that he was not expected to hold out more than a few days if attacked, and that " the hypothesis of an isolated defence against regular siege need not be considered." On the verge of hostilities Joffre told General Fournier, the recently appointed governor, that he would probably employ him and his 30,000 war garrison to besiege Metz.
The ring of forts and internal works had an average diameter of about 4 miles. In the main, the fortifications were high command works of earth and masonry, but some of the newer works had concrete shelters, two of the eastern forts (Cerfontaine and Boussois) possessed each an old type cupola, and Forts Hautmont and Le Bourvian on the slope south of the town and Fort des Sarts north of it were modernized about 1910. In the first days of mobilization the intervals were converted as usual with artillery positions into infantry redoubts, trenches and wire in front of them, and in some cases the forts themselves were treated as the nuclei of groups of field works.
But already in the mobilization period local difficulties, uncertainties as to the real role of the place, lastly, reports of the Germans passing to the left of the Meuse at Huy, had brought about a crisis. The Minister of War, M. Messimy, alarmed by the governor's reports, published a decree dismissing him from his post and, moreover (according to General Pau's evidence before the subsequent court-martial), sent Pau to Maubeuge with instructions to have him shot. Pau, however, was satisfied with what he saw and the decree was cancelled. Thus the defence was morally disorganized from the start, and the collapse of Liege and Namur, both fortresses of concrete and armour, before the 42-cm. and 30-5-cm. howitzers of the enemy, made it evident that resistance could not be maintained for long even before a German patrol had appeared. Finally, the retreat of the French V. Army on the right of the place and of the British forces on the left of it, left Maubeuge exposed to the very form of attack which, officially, it was not expected to meet - investment and regular siege. Owing to its control of rail communications, however, it was important to hold Maubeuge for as long as possible, and the Government gave no instructions relieving the fortress commander of his legal liabilities.
On their side, the Germans, as they pressed on in pursuit of the French and British field forces, at first gave little attention to Maubeuge. A slender cordon of investment was put round it by the first troops which came up, but responsibility for this investment was passed from hand to hand for several days till finally Gen. von Zwehl, with half his VII. Res. Corps (14th Res. Div.) and a brigade of the VII. Active Corps, was left in charge of the operation. It was estimated that the French garrison numbered 7,000; in reality its strength was 40,000 to 4 5,000. For their part the French seemed to have been equally ignorant of the strength of the investing force, which at first was not more than io,000.
The plan of attack, proposed by the artillery general who had reduced Liege and Namur, and adopted by von Zwehl, was a main attack on the north-east point (Salemagne Work - Fort Boussois) and a succeeding attack south of the Sambre on Rocq Work and Fort Cerfontaine. The method was that of pure bombardment accompanied by a careful advance of the infantry as close to the objective as possible and followed by assault after the ruin of the defences. But its application was in this instance limited by two factors, the numerical weakness of the besiegers and the shortage of ammunition for the siege artillery, and during the progress of the siege there were several differences of opinion as to procedure between the commander, the artillery general and the engineer general concerned. Thus the record of this siege, as compared with those of Liege and Namur where ammunition could be poured out, is one of slow, careful and somewhat hesitating advance, and it was this principally which enabled the place, in spite of its technical weaknesses, to hold out longer than either of the Belgian fortresses.
The loose investment which had begun on Aug. 25 was first regularized, but the forces available only allowed of the west front being watched by a few squadrons of cavalry in the Autnois region, and the line of defence in front of the siege artillery emplacements scarcely extended far enough north to give adequate protection to the most important of the batteries, viz. the 42-cm., placed near Givry. But, as it turned out, no coup was attempted by the garrison, and the siege artillery was gradually put in position east of the fortress during Aug. 28-31, batteries opening fire successively. It formed two main groups north of the Sambre and a scattered group south of it. The 42-cm. battery and two German 305-cm. batteries and one battery of medium guns were S.E. of Givry; two Austrian 305-cm. batteries, one (afterwards two) of 21-cm. howitzers, and three of medium guns and howitzers, between Erquelinnes, Peissant, Merbesen-Chateau; and two 21-cm. batteries (afterwards one) and one of medium guns in the wooded valleys south of the Sambre.
Owing to shortage of ammunition, these siege batteries fired only slowly during Aug. 30, while the French from other forts and interval-batteries fired now heavily, now not at all, with the purpose of confusing the ideas of the attack and perhaps enticing the Germans into a premature assault; in this object they very nearly succeeded on Aug. 31 when the German artillery general urged von Zwehl to storm at once. In the end however, von Zwehl declined the proposal. The second division of his VII. Res. Corps (the 13th Res.), hitherto detained at Liege against the contingency of insurrections, only began to arrive piecemeal on Aug. 3 1 and it had to be used chiefly to complete the investment on the west side. Moreover, he was continually being pressed to give up the brigade borrowed from the II. Army, notably at the time of the battle of Guise when that army was in difficulties. Including this brigade, and all forces of the 13th Res. Div. which had arrived before the end of the siege, the final infantry strength of the siege force was no more than 27 battalions, which were distributed (unequally, of course) over a perimeter of some 60 kilometres.
The bold policy of Namur was obviously impossible here, and the guns were allowed to continue their slow bombardment till the works should be reported 'as beyond question " stormripe." Till the arrival of two aeroplanes on Sept. 2, no definite idea was obtained either of the damage caused by the bombardment or of the internal dispositions of the enemy whose sorties, on Sept. r, though repulsed, were an additional incentive to caution in the attack procedure. Even on Sept. 3, when it had become known from air observation that Fort Boussois and Salemagne Work were badly damaged, no drastic action was taken.
On Sept. 4, however, the siege entered on a new phase. Calls from the II. Army on the Marne for the return of the borrowed brigade and, even more, reports of the landing of a great army of Russians at Ostend - the latter so convincing that at one time it was under consideration to give up the siege altogether - showed von Zwehl that he must force the issue. Accordingly, on Sept. 5 the German infantry was launched to the assault of Bersillies and Salemagne works, which were carried, and pushed close up to Fort Boussois, in front of which heavy trench mortars were emplaced during the night of Sept. 5-6. A secondary attack on Rocq Work, south of the Sambre, was repulsed. Next day, Sept. 6, Fort Boussois and Rocq Work were stormed, and a general advance was begun from the front Bersillies - Rocq toward Maubeuge while the siege artillery changed positions forward. The resistance of the retiring French infantry however was stubborn, and von Zwehl suspended further penetration till the forts on either side of the breach should have been reduced, viz. Les Sarts, Heronfontaine and Leveau on the N. and N.E. fronts and Cerfontaine on the south-west. Thanks to the arrival of a second battery of 42-cm. guns (on railway mountings) from Mons, and to the expenditure of almost the last rounds of the 42-cm. and 305-cm. at Givry (the 21-cm. ammunition was already exhausted), all these works were in the hands of the Germans in the early afternoon of Sept. 7. Thereupon Fournier, the moral of whose troops had been completely broken down by a week's bombardment, surrendered with some 40,000 men, plus 377 guns, just as von Zwehl received a peremptory order from von Billow to send the 29th Infantry Brigade south at once.
The resistance of Maubeuge had lasted for 9 days (counting from the opening of the bombardment), longer than that of Liege or Namur and nearly as long as that of Antwerp, and had kept five brigades of active and reserve infantry occupied during the critical days of the battle of the Marne. If the duration of the defence was due largely to the weakness of the attack, and notably to the shortage of siege ammunition, it must not be forgotten on the other hand that the majority of the forts were completely antiquated, and that the troops of the mobile defence consisted in the main of men of the older and oldest classes, unsuited to field service. General Fournier, after being subjected to bitter persecution, was brought to trial by a courtmartial early in 1920 and com p letely exonerated.
After the surrender, the Germans decided not to retain Maubeuge as a point d'appui, and blew up all the works.
(C. F. A.)
